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Using a novel dataset of 2,639 cross-border buyout investments during 1998-2007 in 38 
countries, we find that the institutional quality of the portfolio company country, as measured 
by the ranking in the composite index of political, economic and financial risk, is an important 
determinant of cross-border buyout performance in terms of exit success. The higher the 
institutional quality of the portfolio company country, the higher the probability of a successful 
exit via IPO or M&A. PE firms’ international experience, industrial experience, and reputation 
based on deal experience help to improve buyout exit success and their industrial experience 
could mitigate the adverse influence of institutional distance between the portfolio company 
and the PE firm countries.  
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“[We] had poor performance in Spain, Italy, and Asian countries for three 
reasons: unfamiliarity with those markets, fierce local market competition, and 
investment discipline/regulation.” Simon Borrows, Chief Executive, 3i Plc.  
1. Introduction 
A leveraged buyout (LBO), an important part of private equity (PE) investments, is the 
acquisition of a company financed with a substantial portion of borrowed funds. During a 
typical buyout investment, PE firms (1) improve the portfolio company’s value by conducting 
financial, governance, and operational engineering (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008), (2) exit 
portfolio companies as PE funds have a limited contractual lifetime, and (3) return capital to 
their investors. Cross-border PE investments have become a phenomenon since the late 1990s 
and eventual exit success has always been of highest importance not only for the portfolio 
companies but also for the PE firms investing in a foreign country. In this paper, we examine 
the determinants of cross-border buyout performance based on the framework of institution.   
Uncertainty and information asymmetry could create transaction obstacles for PE 
investments. Formal institutions are a set of political, economics and contract rules which guide 
the human behavior and interaction (North, 1990). When making their investment in countries 
of higher institution quality, which offers stronger investor protection and contract enforcement 
and has less political, economic and financial uncertainty and lower transaction costs, PE firms 
could facilitate the divestment process and are more likely to exit the portfolio company 
successfully. Further, when PE firms invest abroad, such transaction problems could be more 
severe because of the significant intrinsic risks arising from the institutional, cultural and 
geographic distance of a foreign country which could jeopardize the exit success (Li, Vertinsky, 
and Li, 2014; Buchner, Espenlaub, Khurshed, and Mohamed, 2017). However, PE firms could 
accumulate local business, institutional and cultural knowledge and increase international 
practice in their ongoing activities. Also, PE firms tend to circumscribe investment activities 
by focusing on specific industries and develop their industry expertise, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry and uncertainty (Cressy, Munari, and Mallipiero, 2007; Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein, 2008) and helping them to overcome the institutional barriers.  
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The previous literature on cross-border investment performance mainly either focuses 
on early-stage venture capital (VC)’s cross-border performance (Dai, Jo, and Kassicieh, 2012; 
Li et al., 2014; Nahata, Hazarika, and Tandon, 2014; Buchner et al., 2017) or compares PE’s 
buyout performance in domestic markets within different countries (Strömberg, 2008; Hammer, 
Knauer, Pflücke, and Schwetzler, 2017). To our knowledge, no study has focused on country-
specific factors predicting a PE cross-border buyout’s eventual exit success. In this paper, we 
attempt to fill this gap by examining the determinants of cross-border buyout performance with 
a focus on the differences in institutional quality across countries and the role of PE firm’s 
experience in these markets.  
Our study is the first using a novel dataset of portfolio companies’ details of PE firms 
around the world to offer important insights into the determinants of buyout success in both 
developed and developing countries. We adopt a sample of 2,639 cross-border buyout 
investments in 38 countries between 1998 and 2007. To proxy for the country’s institution 
quality, we use the country risk index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
database. ICRG has recorded the country composite risk index for more than 140 countries and 
regions since 1984 by taking the political, economic, and financial risks into account. A country 
is of low risk and of high institution quality if the country risk index is higher than 80 points. 
We measure the institutional distance between two countries based on the absolute country risk 
index differences between the portfolio company country and PE firm country. To proxy for 
cultural distance, we adopt the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions which include power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. We create four learning variables: 
country-specific, multinational, and industrial experience, and reputation based on deal 
experience.  
Following Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) and Nahata et al. (2014), we measure 
performance in terms of exit success. We define the PE’s portfolio company exit to be 
successful if it is later brought to the market through an initial public offering (IPO) or acquired 
by another company. We first examine the relationship between exit success and institutional, 
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cultural, and learning factors at the portfolio company-PE firm country-pair level. We then 
examine the probability of a successful exit in a Cox Hazard model. In additional analyses, we 
study the impact of the above factors on the choice between IPO and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) as exit routes.  
This paper demonstrates that the exit success increases when the quality of the portfolio 
company country’s institutional environment is higher. The institutional differences between 
PE firm and portfolio company countries raise an obstacle to cross-border investment and are 
detrimental to the exit success. However, the cultural distance between the countries of PE 
firms and their portfolio companies has no significant impact on cross-border buyout 
performance. Further, PE firm’s deal experience is positively related to the likelihood of the 
exit success. Our findings on PE’s performance are consistent with those in Li et al. (2014) 
who report insignificant and marginally significant mitigating effects of country-specific and 
multinational experience on institutional distance for VC’s cross-border performance. 
However, we find that PE firms’ industrial experience helps them to reduce the institutional 
barriers. PE firms with more industrial experience learn more and gain deeper knowledge of 
companies in that industry. Cressey et al. (2007) and Gompers et al. (2008) show that VC firms 
with the most industrial experience are most responsive to public signals of investment 
opportunities. Consequently, being an industry expert could also alleviate the burden of being 
a foreigner for PE firms. 
In terms of exit strategies, compared with choosing M&A as the exit route, PE firms 
are more likely to exit via IPO when PE firms are in an investment club and when the initial 
buyout value is larger. In contrast to unsuccessful exits, the probability of going IPO increases 
when PE firms have more experience and form an investment club and when the deal size is 
larger. Similarly, the probability of choosing M&A increases when the quality of the 
institutional environment is higher and when PE firms are more experienced.  
The results are robust to the self-selection issue in which the performance of PE firms 
may be attributable to the quality of their portfolio companies rather than PE firms’ experience. 
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We adopt a variation of Heckman’s (1979) correction procedure. In the first stage, we estimate 
the experienced PE firms’ likelihood of investing in a portfolio company. In the second stage, 
we include the inverse Mills ratio received from the first-step probit model as an additional 
control variable to estimate the buyout performance. The results are also robust when we adopt 
the multiple imputation method to compensate for the missing records of deal value.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Previous PE literature either 
focuses on the investments of cross-border VC firms or compares buyout performance in 
domestic markets with different countries. Nahata et al. (2014) examine the influence of 
institutional differences on global VC success. Both VC and buyout investments are alternative 
investments and illiquid. However, buyouts, as a new form of company structure (Jensen, 1989) 
and important part of M&A activities (financial bidders), acquire mature companies and are 
different from VC investments which enter start-ups and adopt stage-financing. How 
institutional differences affect cross-border buyout investments is not well answered yet. 
Holloway, Lee, and Shen (2016) shed lights on cross-border LBO activities by examining 
issues at the stage of entry. Our paper investigates the buyout performance at the stage of exit 
which completes the investment process. Consequently, it helps us to deepen the understanding 
and expands the literature of internationalization of PE.  
Also, this paper complements a number of studies examining the role of institutions in 
cross-border M&A (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Ferreira, Massa, and 
Matos, 2010; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012). They do not incorporate LBO in the sample and 
examine M&A performance measured by offer premium and deal announcement return. The 
acquirer’s performance in LBO could not be easily examined because PE firms usually are in 
limited partnership and not listed in stock exchanges. Our findings offer direct evidence of the 
influence of institutional differences across countries and between portfolio company country 
and PE firm country on buyout performance.  
Moreover, this paper is related to the literature on PE experience and reputation (Cressy 
et al., 2007; Gompers et al., 2008; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011; 
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Meuleman and Wright, 2011) and investigates the importance of experience in the cross-border 
setting. Lastly, to alleviate common data limitations in previous deal-level studies, we construct 
a dataset by extracting portfolio companies’ details of 1,008 PE firms around the world and 
shed light on the determinants of buyout success in both developed and developing markets.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature and the framework of institution and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the 
data and the variables construction. Section 4 discusses the empirical analyses. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1 Literature review 
The literature on PE performance can be categorized into two groups: fund-level studies 
and deal-level studies. Metrick and Yasuda (2011) outline both advantages and limitations of 
these studies. The net of fund fees and carry could be calculated at the fund level. However, 
there is missing information about timing and exits of individual projects. Also, investment 
write-offs which incur losses are not observed at the fund level. In contrast, deal-level data 
could alleviate the selection bias problem as the outcome of unsuccessful investments could be 
tracked. Nevertheless, deal-level studies suffer from data incompleteness (Kaplan, Sensoy, and 
Strömberg, 2002) and a novel data set or a model which could overcome the data problem is 
thus required.  
Fund-level studies track the stream of cash flow and can shed light on the risk and return 
of PE investment (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou, 2012). Several deal-
level studies also consider the risk and returns (Groh and Gottschalg, 2008; Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Phalippou, and Gottschalg, 2015). Other deal level studies examine the real effects such as 
post-buyout production efficiency (Alperovych, Amess, and Wright, 2013). Deal-level studies 
also consider the determinants of buyout exit, including PE firm characteristics and strategies 
(Arcot, Fluck, Gaspar, and Hege, 2015; Hammer et al., 2017).  
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There is emerging literature focusing on the cross-border PE investment performance. 
Papers in the international VC field analyze the determinants of VC exit performance:  legal 
system and economic/market activities across countries (Nahata et al., 2014), legal, 
institutional, cultural distance between the country of VC firm and that of entrepreneurial firm 
(Li et al., 2014; Nahata et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2017), and syndication with local VC and 
joint venture (Dai et al., 2012). Few papers study cross-border buyout investment performance. 
In a contemporaneous study, Chemmanur, Hull, and Krishnan (2014) examines the exit 
performance of US buyout specialists and exploits the exogenous shock to the effective 
proximity of US PE investors to other countries.     
2.2 Hypothesis development  
Gompers and Lerner (2004) state that there is little theoretical attention being paid to 
the divestment aspect of PE and therefore established theories are limited in their ability to 
explain the sale of portfolio companies. In previous cross-border investment studies, the 
influence of law and institution (see e.g. Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and national distance (see e.g. 
Nahata et al., 2014) on investments are well documented. The framework of institution could 
also be adopted to develop the hypotheses in the cross-border buyout setting. North (1990) 
defines the institution as the “rule of the game in a society” and “humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction”. The institution emphasizes the role of information asymmetry 
and transaction cost in economic activities and the key function of the institution is to reduce 
the uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to facilitate interaction among people. 
Williamsons (2000) establishes four hierarchies of the institution and the first two levels are 
country-specific and vary across different countries. The first level is the informal institution 
which comes from socially transmitted information and is part of the culture (North, 1990). 
The second level is the formal constraints, including constitutions, contract laws and 
enforcement of property rights. Differences in formal and informal rules result in different 
levels of information asymmetry and transaction cost.  
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2.2.1 Formal institutions 
Formal rules contain political and legal rules, economics rules, and contracts. The 
purpose of these rules is to facilitate political or economic exchange (North, 1990). There are 
two contrasting views on effects of law and institution on financial transactions. Under the 
“Coasian” view, institutional differences do not matter as sophisticated investors could 
privately negotiate and optimize the contract to mitigate the impediments (Bergman and 
Nicolaievsky, 2007). For instance, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) state that, in the emerging 
economy China, neither its legal or financial system is well developed. However, the 
institutional impediments do not prohibit China’s fast growth. Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg 
(2007) show that legal regime does not matter, and more experienced VC investors adopt US 
style sophisticated contracts. 
Under the “law matters” view, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998) show that the legal system exerts a positive influence on investor protection and capital 
market development. Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) state that appropriate laws and 
regulations and high enforcement of shareholder and creditor rights are instrumental in building 
up the market confidence and attracting investments. The law and institution could affect the 
PE exit in two ways: institutional differences across countries and between the PE firm country 
and portfolio company country.  
Firstly, all else being equal, in a country with a better-developed institutional system, 
the capital market will be more active and cross-border PE firms have more opportunities to 
divest their portfolios. Further, the exit decision will be influenced by the information 
asymmetry between the foreign PE investors and local markets and the transaction cost. In a 
country with high institution quality, information asymmetry and transaction cost could be 
reduced as there are stronger investor protection and contract enforcement, and less political, 
economic and financial uncertainty, facilitating the exit process. Secondly, when PE firms 
invest abroad and the local formal rules could be significantly different from their home 
countries, there will be limitations on the effective transfer and enforcement of the governance 
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structure and contract design they adopt in their home countries (Tykvová and Scherlter, 2014). 
Consequently, institutional differences between two countries could be the obstacle to cross-
border investments.   
Hypothesis 1a null: In line with the “Coasian” view, institutional quality of the portfolio 
company country is not associated with the likelihood of a successful exit.  
Hypothesis 1a alternative: In line with the “law matters” view, higher institutional quality of 
the portfolio company country is associated with a higher likelihood of a successful exit.  
Hypothesis 1b: Larger institutional differences are associated with a lower likelihood of a 
successful exit.  
2.2.2 Informal institutions 
The informal institution is referred to the culture. Culture could exert influences on 
economic activities as it shapes economic individuals’ choices and perceptions (Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988). The influence of cultural differences on cross-border investments has been 
examined in recent studies but the results are mixed. Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) 
report that the cultural distance adversely affects the cross-border mergers volume and 
combined announced returns. They argue that different cultural values could lead to 
impediments such as mistrust, misunderstanding or mismatched goals in cooperation. Li et al. 
(2014) and Buchner et al. (2017) find similar results in studying cross-border VC performance. 
However, Nahata et al. (2014) find that cultural distance increases the VC success. They argue 
the cultural disparity between VC firms and their portfolio companies leads to more rigorous 
due diligence and deal selection, and hence improves the performance.  
The influence of cultural distance on the outcome of buyout investments has not been 
seriously examined. Li et al. (2014) state that cultural distance between VC firms and their 
portfolio companies could adversely affect the VC performance in three ways: communication 
problems, value and beliefs conflicts, and liability of outsidership. In the buyout context, 
similarly, cultural diversity can lead to different approaches to deal negotiation, contract 
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negotiation, corporate policy design, and working relationship development and thus increase 
information and transaction costs, leading to conflicts and investment failures.  
On the other hand, in an LBO, PE firms usually fully acquire the portfolio company 
and PE firms’ targets are mature companies in the late development stage which could generate 
a stable cash flow to meet the debt repayment requirement (Jensen, 1989). Also, buyout 
investors are sophisticated. To add firm value, they restructure the portfolio company’s capital 
structure, replace the management team with industrial experts, and guide the operational 
change. In comparison, VC firms invest in early-stage and start-up companies. Understanding 
of business ideas and know-how of founder team characteristics are essential to VC 
investments (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, and Strebulaev, 2016). 
Consequently, buyout investors might not suffer from the adverse influence of cultural 
differences because they rely more on the hard information while VC investors could be subject 
to cultural differences as they rely more on the soft information.  
Hypothesis 2 null: Cultural differences will not influence the cross-border buyout performance. 
Hypothesis 2 alternative: Cultural differences adversely influence the cross-border buyout 
performance. 
2.2.3 Learning  
North (1990) claims that games are shaped by formal and informal constraints, but the 
contrast comes from organizational learning in the repeated game. Under the “experience 
matters” view, Meuleman and Wright (2011) claim that PE firms can reduce institutional 
barriers through learning. Learning is the process in which firms accumulate local institutional 
and cultural knowledge about a certain market or develop insights into a certain industry 
through their ongoing activities. De Clercq and Dimov (2007) argue that PE firms obtain 
knowledge about local businesses and institutions through prior investments and acquire skill 
sets in the process of evaluation, selection, and management. Also, PE firms could establish 
their local networks through prior investments in the target country. As cross-border 
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investments can be considered as part of the internationalization process, multinational 
experience of a rich array of environments with a broad range of institutional and cultural 
characteristics also plays a vital role in the cross-border investment process (Li et al., 2014). In 
addition, PE firms with substantial industrial experience could identify better investment 
opportunities in a certain industry and obtain the know-how to manage and add value to these 
investments (Gompers et al., 2008). PE firms’ learning could mitigate the information 
asymmetry created by intuitional barriers, lower the transaction cost, and hence facilitate the 
exit process. Further, as PE firms approach the buyout market repeatedly, building reputation 
is necessary because such a reputation can serve as certification and help to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between PE firms and potential buyers (Gompers, 1996).  
Various empirical studies provide insights into PE learning and experience and confirm 
the positive role of experience in investment activities. Cressy et al. (2007) find that industrial 
specialized PE firms are more likely to have higher post-buyout profitability. Demiroglu and 
James (2010) argue that reputable PE firms have persistent performance, and this confirms PE 
firms’ skills in selecting, monitoring, and restructuring. Reputation based on deal experience 
will help PE firms to deliver the impression of being less risky to investors and banks, resulting 
in better lending terms.    
Hypothesis 3a: More experienced PE firms are more likely to perform better in the cross-
border buyout.  
Hypothesis 3b: PE firms’ deal experience helps to mitigate the adverse influence of distance.  
3. Data and variable construction 
3.1 Data and sample  
Our sample of global LBOs comes from Mergermarket, a data provider for M&A 
transactions. Mergermarket tracks investment records for 1,008 worldwide PE firms (as of 31st 
December 2015). Unlike other databases such as Capital IQ M&A and SDC Platinum M&A, 
which track investments at the transaction level, Mergermarket categorizes investments into 
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exit portfolios and holding portfolios at the PE firm level. It provides information on holding 
periods, buyout/exit types, transaction value, deal description, and financial characteristics.  
We obtain the sample as follows. Firstly, we select the investment of which the deal 
type “buyout” is specified. We keep the investment with the leading PE in club deals where 
more than one PE firm participates in the transaction.1 Since our aim is to study cross-border 
buyout performance, we select deals if the dominant country of the portfolio company is 
different from the country in which the PE firm is headquartered. In addition, we keep deals 
for which transaction dates and holding periods are non-missing. Although Mergermarket 
tracks the deal history back to 1997, it has provided more reliable information since 1998. 
Consequently, following Nahata et al. (2014), we include buyout transactions from 1st January 
1998 and exclude all countries with less than ten observations to avoid the adverse effects of 
outliers. We also exclude the overseas territories such as the Channel Islands, Bermuda, and 
Puerto Rico to avoid “shell” operation. We stop the sample at the end of 2007 to be able to 
track the outcome of all buyout transactions during an eight-year window until the end of 2015.2 
The final sample has 2,639 deals from 38 countries from 1998 to 2007.  
To supplement other deal characteristics such as deal value and management 
participation, we match the sample with two other buyout databases: SDC Platinum M&A and 
Zephyr. Zephyr has better coverage for European deals and smaller deals. We match these 
databases using the PE firm’s name, the portfolio company’s name, and the transaction date.3 
Since some PE firms have changed their names (for example, HSBC PE is renamed as Montagu 
PE), we extensively check the company website, confirm the change, and carefully match 
                                                            
1 The leading PE is defined as the one which invests the largest stake or the oldest firm in the club deals if stake information 
is missing (Nahata et al. 2014). To confirm the correctness of leading PE firms, we also go through the deal description and 
check if the PE firm is leading the consortium/group. As Mergermarket keeps records at the PE firm level, same transaction 
will be recorded several times for club deals. We check the deal ID and target name and delete duplicates. Only transactions 
with leading PE firms are kept. 
2 Strömberg (2008) investigates a sample of 21,000 LBO transactions 1970-2007 and documents that the median duration is 9 
years. Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) document that percentage of exits within seven years is about 55% for deals after 2000. 
In line with their findings, this paper leaves a window which is at least 8 years for PE firms to exit their portfolios.  
3 Deal is labelled as “Leveraged Buyout” in SDC and “Institutional Buyout” in Zephyr; deal status is “completed deals”; the 
time span is from 1st January 1998 to 31st December 2007. The geographical area is worldwide, and the dominant country is 
defined as the place where the portfolio company is located in. In Zephyr, the PE name is not always specified so that we go 
through each deal description to figure out the PE firms behind each deal. 
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different databases. In addition, we carefully check the industry based on the sub-industry 
description in Mergermarket and reclassify it into one of the 11 SIC industries, as defined by 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) SIC Code List.  
Finally, we obtain institutional data from the ICRG database and cultural distance data 
from Taras, Steel, and Kirkman (2011). The market development data comes from SDC 
Platinum M&A database. Other country and country-pair controls are from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, World Bank, the Foreign Law Guide database, 
and the CEPII website. 
3.2 Variable construction  
3.2.1 Dependent variables  
Mergermarket identifies the following four exit types: IPO, secondary buyout, trade 
sale, and other exits. Other exits are exit routes excluding IPO, secondary buyout and trade sale 
as well as routes for which Mergermarket could not track details. We follow the previous 
literature (Hochberg et al., 2007; Nahata et al., 2014) and code exits as being successful if PE 
firms were able to exit portfolio companies either via IPO or M&A (trade sales and secondary 
buyout).  
In the aggregate country pair level analysis, we calculate the successful exit ratio as the 
number of successful exits to the number of investments for each portfolio company-PE firm 
country pair.  For the deal-level analysis, to take the time-to-successful exit and right-censored 
data characteristics into account, we adopt the survival analysis. The hazard rate is the 
conditional probability that the PE firm divests the portfolio company successfully. The time-
to-successful exit is the number of months between the buyout date and the successful exit date. 
For portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits, the holding time is the number of months 
between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date.  
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3.2.2 Explanatory variables  
The explanatory variables can be categorized into four sets of variables. The first set 
pertains to the institution. The second set consists of learning factors from different 
perspectives. We also control for deal characteristics including management participation, club 
size (the number of PE firms) and deal value. Country and country-pair controls include local 
LBO market development, common religion, common language, and geographic distance. 
Appendix 2 provides detailed description of all deal characteristics and country and country-
pair control variables.   
3.2.2.1 Factors related to institutions 
Firstly, we obtain the country risk index from International Country Risk Guide 
database. This database has been intensively used in the law and intuition studies (La Porta et 
al., 1998; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Ferreira 
et al., 2010; Nahata et al., 2014). The country risk index is a composite index: political risk 
components account for 50% and the rest consists of economic and financial risk components. 
Political risk components include government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment 
profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, 
law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. Economic 
risk rating aims to provide a measure of a country’s current economic strengths and weakness. 
It includes following components: GDP per head, real GDP growth, annual inflation rate, 
budget balance as a percentage of GDP, and current account as a percentage of GDP. Financial 
risk rating measures a country’s ability to finance its official, commercial, and trade debt 
obligations. It includes the following components: foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign 
debt services as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current age account as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services, net international liquidity as months of import 
cover, and exchange rate stability. The composite index calculation method is developed and 
used in several law and institution studies, for example, Nahata et al. (2014). The positive 
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aspect of using a single composite index is to alleviate the influence of multicollinearity when 
all individual variables are included.   
Bhagwat, Brogaard, and Julio (2017) classify countries into three groups based the 
political risk components: medium risk country (political risk score is between 60 and 80), high 
risk country (political risk score is below 60), and the rest group (political risk score is higher 
than 80). In line with their measurement, to proxy institution quality of the portfolio company 
country, we create a dummy variable Low_Risk_Country which is defined as the one with 
composite rating score higher than 80 points in the ICRG database. Low risk countries have 
lower political, economic and financial risk and thus have higher institution quality. The 
variable Institutional_Distance is defined as the logarithm of the absolute differences between 
the country risk indices of PE firm country and portfolio company country.  
To proxy for the cultural distance, we adopt the Hofstede measure. There are four 
dimensions in his cultural evaluation: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, 
and masculinity. We compute the multidimensional cultural distance between the country of 
the PE firms and the country of the portfolio company as follows:  
Cultural	Distance ൌ 	 ሺ∑ ሺC୘େ,୧ െ C୔୉,୧ሻ
ଶସ୧ୀଵ ሻଵ/ଶ
4  
where C୘େ,୧ is the portfolio company’s national culture measured on element ݅ and C୔୉,୧ is the 
leading PE firm’s national culture measured on element ݅. To capture changes in the cultural 
distance, we use culture scores from Teras et al. (2011). These data are country-specific and 
time-varying over three periods: 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. If the buyout year is between 1998 
and 1999, the 1990s data will be used; if the buyout year is between 2000 and 2007, the 2000s 
data will be used. Following Nahata et al. (2014), if the data are missing for the 1990s, we will 
use 2000s score as the proxy. If the data are missing for both 1990s and 2000s, the 1980s score 
will be used as the proxy.4    
                                                            
4 There are two countries where we could not obtain culture information from Teras et al. (2011): Iceland and Luxemburg. 
Luxemburg is the portfolio company country or PE firm country in 29 investments and Iceland is PE firm country in one 
investment, amounting to a total of 30 investments. We adopt the average of culture score of the bordered or surrounding 
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3.2.2.2 Factors related to learning  
We construct four variables to measure different aspects of experience. Strömberg 
(2008) shows that the experience of PE firms consistently explains the global exit behavior and 
the variation in holding periods. The first learning variable is the Country_Experience. We 
construct this variable as the number of buyouts which the PE firm completed in the country 
of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. The second variable 
Multinational_Experience is constructed as the number of foreign countries in which the PE 
firm invested from1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). 
The next variable Industrial_Experience aims to capture the industrial specialization as each 
PE firm has its own industrial focus. For example, in Mergermarket records, the UK PE group 
3i focuses more on service industries. Industry experience is calculated as the number of 
buyouts which the PE firm completed in the industry of the portfolio company from 1990 to 
the year prior to the initial buyout. Further, as argued by Demiroglu and James (2010), 
experience will accumulate over time, but this will not be able to distinguish between funds. 
Following Demiroglu and James (2010), we construct another variable Reputation based on 
recent experience, i.e. the total number of buyout transactions completed by the PE firm in the 
three years prior to the initial buyout. As there is a time gap between the initial buyout date and 
the final exit date, all measures link PE firms’ experience to their future performance and thus 
avoid the reverse causality.   
3.3 Summary statistics  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of cross-border buyouts. Panel A 
reports the incidence of buyout based on the buyout year. We classify the exit outcome types 
based on the Mergermarket records as of 31st December 2015: successful exits and 
unsuccessful exits. Successful exits represent 65% of the sample and portfolio companies are 
                                                            
countries as the proxy, namely, the average of the Belgium, France, and Germany for Luxemburg and the average of other four 
Scandinavian countries for Iceland. We also re-run the main regressions after excluding these 30 observations and document 
similar results.  
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divested via IPO (4%) or M&A (60%).5 The sample suggests that PE firms prefer M&A as the 
way to divest their portfolios. Unsuccessful exits include other exits (7%) and non-exit ones 
(29%). Other exits are portfolio companies for which Mergermarket loses tracking information 
and non-exit portfolios are still privately held by PE firms. The sample is comparable to that 
used by Strömberg (2008) who reports one-third of portfolio companies are still private until 
2008 and M&A earns its popularity as the divestment alternative to IPO. In terms of the 
distribution of the sample, most buyout portfolios taking place in early years are exited 
successfully. For the buyout portfolios that took place in 2007, 47% of them are still private 
until 2015. The holding time is thus right censored. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
In Panel B of Table 1, we show the incidence of buyout portfolios based on industry. 
Most portfolio companies operate in the manufacturing industry, amounting to 45% of the deals. 
Service industry and retail industry account for 24% and 7% of the buyouts, respectively. The 
successful exit ratios are higher in manufacturing (69%) and service (66%) industries. To 
control for the industry heterogeneity, we include industry fixed effects in our empirical tests.  
Panel C of Table 1 shows the clustering of buyouts across countries of portfolio 
companies. Cross-border buyouts in Germany constitute 12% of the deals and the UK accounts 
for 10%. Our sample is comprehensive as we include deals in both developed and developing 
markets. Further, emerging Asian countries have attracted foreign investors’ attention in recent 
years, especially China and India, as there are rapid macroeconomic growth, demographic 
change, and legal and financial reforms (Dai et al., 2012). India and China account for 5% and 
4% of the deals, respectively. We find that in these countries, the successful exit ratios are 
lower than 50%. This result is consistent with Lerner, Sørensen, and Strömberg (2009) who 
find a low exit ratio in emerging Asian countries. We list the countries of PE firms in panel D 
of Table 1 the US and the UK markets are generally believed to be the most developed LBO 
                                                            
5 IPO: 110/2,639 = 4%; M&A: 1,596/2,639 = 60%; other exits: 176/2,639 = 7%; non-exit ones: 757/2,639=29%.  
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markets, and PE specialists from these two countries contribute to 67% of the buyouts. Table 
2 reports the descriptive statistics for main explanatory variables.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Aggregate cross-border buyout successful exit ratio   
In this section, we test the relationship between cross-border buyout exit success and 
institutional and cultural factors at the country-pair level. Following Ferreira et al. (2010) and 
Erel et al. (2012), we perform both cross-sectional and panel tests. We construct the dependent 
variables as follows: (1) for cross-sectional tests, the outcome variable is the number of 
successful exits of all portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in over the entire period 
in country pair i over the total number of portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in 
over the entire period in country pair i ; (2) for panel tests, the outcome variable is the number 
of successful exits of all portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in in year t in country 
pair i over the total number of portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in in year t in 
country pair i. We cluster standard errors at the country pair level and include year fixed effects 
in the panel tests.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results in Table 3 show that the successful exit ratio is positively related to the 
institution quality of the portfolio company country and negatively related to the institutional 
distance between portfolio company country and PE firm country across all specifications. 
However, cultural distance has no significant influence on the exit success. The results are 
robust and qualitatively similar when we take the maturity of local LBO market and other 
country and country-pair characteristics into account in models 2 and 4. Overall, the results in 
Table 3 support hypotheses 1a the “law matters” view and 1b (La Porta et al., 1998; Nahata et 
al., 2014). In the country of well-developed institution system, information asymmetry and 
transaction cost could be lower and PE firms are more likely to bring their portfolio company 
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to IPO or M&A. However, if PE firms are unfamiliar with local institutional rules, information 
asymmetry and transaction cost are higher, and it is more difficult for them to successfully exit 
portfolio companies.   
4.2 Likelihood of a successful exit – hazard rate of a successful exit 
We apply the survival analysis to analyze the impact of the chosen explanatory 
variables on the time-to-successful exit. After the initial buyout, a portfolio company can be 
privately held, unidentified as tracking details are missing, or divested via IPO or M&A. The 
right-censored observations in the dataset are those portfolio companies that are either privately 
held as of the cut-off date 31st December 2015 or lost. We use a dichotomous variable 
describing the status of a portfolio company as either successful exits (IPO and M&A) or 
unsuccessful exits (other exits and non-exit ones). In survival models, we interpret the 
probability of a failure event for a buyout portfolio as the probability of its exit success. We 
adopt both non-parametric and semi-parametric approaches of survival analysis to assess the 
influence of chosen explanatory variables on the failure and hazard functions. The non-
parametric analysis provides insights into the difference between groups. The semi-parametric 
approach could be used for the multivariate analysis.  
4.2.1 Non-parametric analysis  
In the non-parametric analysis, we categorize the sample based on institution quality, 
institutional distance, cultural distance, and reputation. We create three new dummy variables. 
The first one is Familiar_Institution which equals one if the institutional distance belongs to 
the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is Familiar_Culture which 
equals one if the cultural distance belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise. Further, 
the variable Reputable_PE is an indicator variable denoting whether the PE firm belongs to the 
top quartile of reputable PE firm group based on the reputation measurement in the year prior 
to the initial buyout. In Kaplan-Meier estimations, the failure function is the cumulative 
probability of a successful exit at any given time t.  
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[Insert Figure 1-4 about here] 
In Figures 1-4, we plot the Kaplan-Meier failure functions based on the institutional 
quality, institutional distance, cultural distance, and reputation, respectively. As plotted in 
Figure 1, the probability of a successful exit at any given time is always higher for the low risk 
country group. In the unreported log-rank test, the difference between these two failure 
functions is significant at 1% level (χଶ ൌ 70.23). The result suggests that in the low risk 
country (i.e. higher institutional environment quality), PE firms have higher likelihoods of 
bringing portfolio companies to successful exits. Figure 2 shows the plot of Kaplan-Meier 
functions based on institutional distance. The failure function of Familiar Institution group is 
always higher than that of the rest of the sample, suggesting a negative relationship between 
institutional distance and probability of a successful exit. The difference is significant at 1% 
level (χଶ ൌ 8.86). In Figure 3, the curves of failure functions are parallel to each other to a 
large degree, and one could therefore expect that there is no significant difference between 
familiar culture group and the rest. The difference in their failure functions is not statistically 
significant (χଶ ൌ 1.56ሻ, indicating that PE firms are not influenced by cultural distance. Finally, 
as shown in Figure 4, the Kaplan-Meier failure function plot of the reputable PE firm is 
consistently above that of the non-reputable PE firm. The difference of these failure functions 
is significant at the 1% level (χଶ ൌ 9.35ሻ. This result suggests that reputable PE firms have 
better performance in cross-border buyout investments.  
Overall, the results of the non-parametric analyses suggest the institutional environment 
quality and reputation are positively associated with the buyout performance and institutional 
distance is negatively related to the buyout performance, supporting hypotheses 1a the “law 
matters” view, 1b and 3a. In addition, we find insignificant influences of cultural differences 
on the buyout performance.  
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4.2.2 Semi-parametric analysis  
In this section, we perform the Cox Proportional Hazard estimation. In the survival 
model, the hazard rate can be referred to as the probability of a successful exit during one unit 
of time, conditional on unsuccessful exit up to time t. A positive and significant coefficient 
would imply a higher hazard rate and a shorter expected holding duration. A negative and 
significant	coefficient would imply a lower hazard rate and a longer expected holding duration.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Across models 1-4 in Table 4, we relate institutional and cultural factors, deal 
characteristics and geographic distance between two countries to the likelihood of a successful 
exit. To avoid multicollinearity, we include measures of experience variables separately. As 
reported in models 1-4 of Table 4, the hazard rate of a successful exit increases when (1) PE 
firms invest in low risk countries, (2) PE firms are more experienced, and (3) management 
participates in the deal. The hazard rate of a successful exit decreases when the institutional 
distance is larger, when the club size is larger, and when the PE firm is geographically far away 
from the portfolio company.  
Firstly, coefficients of the variable Low_Risk_Country are positive and statistically 
significant. In low risk countries, the likelihood of a successful exit is higher, and the expected 
holding time is shorter. In model 1, the coefficient of 0.237 on Low_Risk_Country indicates 
that the estimated hazard ratio of the group based on the dummy Low_Risk_Country is 1.267 
(e0.237). Therefore, the hazard of successful exit when PE firms invest in low risk countries is 
1.267 times higher than that when PE firms invest in other countries. This evidence is in line 
with Nahata et al. (2014) who reports a positive role of legal institution in global VC success 
and provides support to the “law matters” view.  
Secondly, the coefficients on Institutional_Distance is negative and statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level. If PE firms are unfamiliar with the institutional environment 
and institutional distance is larger, the probability of successful exit is lower, and it takes longer 
time for them to exit. The results suggest that institutional barriers are the investment obstacles 
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which is consistent with the previous cross-border studies (Li et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2017). 
This finding supports hypothesis 1b.  
The coefficients of the variable Culture_Distance are insignificant across all models 
and this paper fails to reject the null hypothesis that cultural differences will not influence the 
performance. This result implies that PE firms which are sophisticated investors suffer from 
minimal adverse influences of cultural differences. This is different from the findings on VC 
by Nahata et al. (2014) who show a positive influence of cultural differences on VC exit 
performance and Li et al. (2014) and Buchner et al., (2017) who document a negative 
relationship. Compared to VC firms, buyout firms conduct the LBO to acquire the late-stage 
and mature firms which could generate enough operating cash flow to repay the debt (Jensen, 
1989). Consequently, the sophisticated buyout specialist relies on hard information and thus 
overcomes the barrier of cultural differences.  
In line with Cressey et al. (2007), Gompers et al. (2008), PE firms’ experience and 
reputation have positive impacts on investment performance. Specifically, country experience 
which offers local insights, multinational experience which brings in the knowledge of different 
institutions, industrial experience which offers deep industrial insights, and reputation based 
on deal experience which serves as the certification to resolve asymmetric information 
problems, all help PE firms achieve higher likelihoods of a successful exit in the cross-border 
buyout. The findings support hypothesis 3a.  
We also show that management participation which reduces the information asymmetry 
between insiders and PE managers helps to improve the buyout performance. In terms of club 
size, we find the diseconomies of scale of the PE club as the larger PE club takes a longer time 
to successfully divest the portfolio company. In the later section 4.3, club size is positively 
associated with the likelihood of going IPO and negatively associated with the choice of M&A. 
PE firms frequently adopt M&A as the route to divest portfolio companies, but IPO is 
considered as the most successful way (Gompers, 1996). Combining these results, one could 
argue that although it takes more time for the large PE club to divest the portfolio company, a 
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large PE club improves the cross-border buyout performance in a modest way as it increases 
the probability of bringing the portfolio company to the market through an IPO. When the 
geographic distance is taken into consideration, we provide consistent evidence to support the 
geographic proximity argument (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner, 2010). PE firms are less 
likely to exit successfully if they are far away from their portfolio companies. In model 5, we 
control for other country and country pair characteristics and the adopt the reputation as the 
learning measurement.6 The results are similar to those in models 1-4. In model 6, we include 
deal value to control for the size effect and we find that the larger the size, the higher the 
probability of successful divestment.  
To examine the mitigation effects of a PE firms’ deal experience on institutional 
distance, we construct interaction terms of institutional distance and four deal experience 
variables and include them in the models separately. The results are reported in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The coefficients of interaction terms institutional distance and country-specific 
experience, multinational experience, and reputation based on recent deal experience are 
statistically insignificant. The results suggest that only having the knowledge about the local 
institution, business and international practice might not be enough for PE firms to overcome 
the intuitional barriers. The findings are consistent with Li et al. (2014). However, the 
coefficient of the interaction term of institutional distance and industrial experience are positive 
and significant at the 5% level. In cross-border activities, PE firms could effectively transfer 
the governance structure and enforce the contract design if they have substantial experience in 
the portfolio company’s industry. As PE firms tend to specialize in certain industries, compared 
to other experience, the industrial experience is more important in their investment activities. 
The findings are consistent with Cressy et al. (2007) and Gompers et al. (2008).  
                                                            
6 We also re-run the regressions with other learning variables and take maturity of local market, religion difference, language 
difference, and deal size into consideration and find similar results.  
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Overall, the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard analysis suggest that the hazard rate 
of a successful exit has a positive relationship with the quality of the institutional environment, 
PE firms’ experience and management participation, and has a negative relationship with 
institutional distance and geographic distance, providing supporting evidence to hypotheses 1a 
“law matters” view, 1b and 3a. Moreover, this paper documents that PE firms’ industrial 
experience could help to overcome the adverse influence of institutional distance, which 
supports hypothesis 3b.  
4.3 Exit strategies: IPO versus M&A 
4.3.1 Multinomial analysis on the status 
To test whether the chosen factors have different impacts on the choice between IPO 
and M&A as exit strategies, we first perform the multinomial logit analysis and then relate the 
choice of IPO relative to M&A as exit strategy. The base category for the multinomial analysis 
is the group of portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits (other exits and non-exit ones).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In models 1-4, we relate the learning variables separately as well as other explanatory 
variables to the choice of exit strategy. Compared to the group with unsuccessful exits, the 
likelihood of choosing IPO increases when private equity firms are more experienced, when 
the club size is larger, and when the initial buyout value is higher. M&A is the most frequently 
adopted exit route by buyout specialists. Compared to the unsuccessful exits group, the quality 
of institutional environment is positively associated with the likelihood of choosing a takeover. 
In addition, the PE firm’s experience and reputation help to increase the likelihood of 
conducting M&A. These findings support the conjecture based on the “law matters” and 
“experience matters” views. Also, compared to the unsuccessful exits group, the PE firm is 
more likely to divest the portfolio company via M&A if management participates in the buyout. 
In terms of club size, a large PE club may aim for the most successful divestment way IPO 
(Gompers, 1996).  
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As shown in model 5 of Table 6, the choice of IPO as exit strategy over M&A mainly 
depends on deal characteristics. With management participation, the PE firm prefers the M&A 
over IPO as the exit strategy. The larger the PE club size, the higher the likelihood of PE firms 
bringing the portfolio company to the market through an IPO. The deal value matters for the 
exit strategy as there are certain threshold limits on the IPO requirement (Brau, Francis, and 
Kohers, 2003). The larger the deal value, the higher the probability of going IPO.  
Overall, the results of the above tests show that the probability of bringing the portfolio 
company to the market through an IPO increases when PE firms are more experienced, the PE 
club size is larger and deal value is higher. The probability of divesting the portfolio company 
via M&A rises when the quality of the institutional environment is higher, when the PE firms 
are more experienced, and when the management participates in the buyout.  
4.3.2 Holding time for IPO and M&A 
We also perform the survival analysis on the choice between IPO and M&A as exit 
strategies and report the results in Table 7. The specifications used for this test are the same as 
those in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
As shown in Table 7, the hazard rate of choosing IPO as the exit strategy is related to 
PE firm’s experience and the deal characteristics: it increases when PE firms are more 
experienced, when the PE club size is larger, and when the initial buyout value is larger. Like 
the findings in Table 6, coefficients of all institutional variables are insignificant for the choice 
of going IPO but remain positive. In terms of the hazard rate of choosing M&A as the exit 
strategy, we find that it is positively related to the institutional environment quality and PE 
firms’ experience. Also, management participation increases the hazard rate of choosing M&A. 
Finally, PE club size is positively related to the choice of IPO as the exit route and negatively 
related to the choice of M&A.  
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4.4 Robustness tests 
4.4.1 Selection bias 
The results of the analyses of successful exit can be biased if we ignore the fact that the 
performance is not due to the experience of PE firms, but to the selection of high quality 
portfolio companies. Sørensen (2007) argues that such endogeneity originates from two effects: 
selection effect and monitoring effect. Selection effect means that more experienced PE firms 
select companies of higher quality while monitoring effects mean that PE activities after the 
acquisition add value to the target company. To address concerns of endogeneity, we follow 
Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008), and use the Heckman’s (1979) correction procedure. 
The dependent variable Experienced_PE in the selection stage is an indicator variable denoting 
whether the PE firm belongs to the top quartile of experienced PE firm group based on the 
industrial experience measurement in the year prior to the initial buyout. We adopt the deal 
value which captures the company quality to a certain degree. Sørensen (2007) and Bottazzi et 
al. (2008) argue that aggregate market characteristics are good candidates for exogenous 
variables because the distribution of companies and investors in various markets is exogenous. 
As shown in Panel D of Table 1, the US and the UK PE firms are the most active cross-border 
buyout investors. These two markets are the most two developed markets for PE investments 
and buyout specialists from these two markets tend to accumulate more experience. We use 
two PE firms’ country origins the US and the UK to create two dummy variables as exogenous 
variables. Intuitively, for example, a portfolio company in Australia is more likely to encounter 
foreign investors from the US and the UK. These investors are more likely to be experienced 
buyout specialists. However, conditioned on encountering an experienced investor, there is no 
more screening advantage and the quality of investment of an experienced US or UK investor 
is not necessarily better than that of an experienced France investor. We include these 
explanatory variables in the selection step plus other deal characteristics variables. The first 
stage model estimates the likelihood of the experienced PE firm investing in the portfolio 
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company. We then add the inverse Mills ratio from the first step into the second step regression 
to estimate the performance. The specifications thus are:  
First step (selection):  
ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁݀_ܲܧ	௜ ൌ Probit	൫K୨൯,where	K୧ ൌ 	α୨ ൅ βଵܦ݈݁ܽ_ܸ݈ܽݑ݁௜ ൅
βଶܯܽ݊ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ௜ ൅ βଷܥ݈ݑܾ_ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅	ߚସܷܵ_ܲܧ௜ ൅ βହܷܭ	_ܲܧ௜  
Second step:  
(Cox Hazard): Hazard_Rate = λሺt|Xሻ ൌ λ଴ሺtሻ ∗ e୶౟ᇲஒ౟ାஒ	ூ௡௩௘௥௦௘_ெ௜௟௟௦_ோ௔௧௜௢ 
(Logit): IPO vs M&A = Logit	ሺy୧ሻ, where	y୧ ൌ α୧ ൅ x୧ᇱβ୧ ൅ βܫ݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁_ܯ݈݈݅ݏ_ܴܽݐ݅݋ 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
As shown in Table 8, in the selection stage, the likelihood of the experienced PE firm 
investing in the portfolio company is higher when the initial buyout value is larger and when 
the PE firm is from the US or the UK. In the second step, we find that after controlling for the 
selection bias, the probability and the hazard rate of successful exits increase when the 
institutional environment quality is higher, when PE firms are more experienced, and when the 
management team participates in the deal. We also find consistent evidence of the mitigation 
effect of industrial experience on institutional distance. In terms of the choice between IPO and 
M&A as exit strategies, deal characteristics are important in the decision-making process.  
4.4.2 Imputed deal value  
Our sample includes 2,639 cross-border buyout deals but the sample size decreases to 
1,975 if we require deal value to be available. The sample reduction through missing deal value 
might result in biased estimation. To alleviate the concern of missing value, we follow 
Strömberg (2008) and adopt the multiple imputation to create a complete case dataset.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In Table 9, we present re-estimations of the main models with deal value imputed based 
on the multiple imputation. The main results remain consistent with previous tests. Institution 
quality and private equity firms’ experience insert positive influence on buyout performance 
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while institutional distance has the opposite effect. Moreover, industrial experience could 
mitigate the adverse effects of institutional distance. 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the determinants of the cross-border buyout performance based on 
the framework of institution. We use the Mergermarket database and obtain a sample of 2,639 
cross-border buyout transactions in 38 countries from 1998 to 2007. Firstly, we test the 
relationship between sucessful exit ratio and the factors mentioned above at the country-pair 
level. To study the likelihood of a successful exit ath the deal level, we use the survival analysis 
to examine the determinants of exit success.  
We find that the institutional environment quality is positively related to the likelihood 
of successful exits while such likelihood decreases when the institutional differences between 
PE firm country and portfolio company country are larger. The result is in line with previous 
cross-border VC studies (Nahata et al., 2014) and consistent with the “law matters”  view (La 
porta et al., 1997, 1998). Further, cultural distance does not play a role in determining cross-
border buyout performance. We measure PE firms’ learning from four aspects: country-specific 
experience, multinational experience, industry experience and reputation. Consistent with 
previous studies (Cressey et al. 2007; Gompers et al., 2008), we find that more experienced PE 
firms perform better and their industrial experience has a mitigation effect. In the additional 
analyses examining the choice of exit routes, PE experience, PE club size, and initial buyout 
value are positively associated with the likelihood of going IPO. As the most frequently used 
exit strategy, M&A is more likely to be adopted when the institutional environment quality is 
higher and when PE firms learn more from their past activities. This study is the first using a 
novel dataset of portfolio companies’ details of PE firms around the world to offer important 
insights into the determinants of buyout success in both developed and developing countries.  
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Appendix 1: Variable definition 
Variables  Definition and Source  
Dependent variables   
Successful_Exit_Ratio 
(1) For cross-sectional test, the outcome variable is the number of successful exits of all 
portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in over the entire period in country pair i over 
the total number of portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in over the entire period 
in country pair i ; (2) For the panel test, the outcome variable is the number of successful exits 
of all portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in in year t in country pair i over the 
total number of portfolio companies which the PE firms invested in in year t in country pair i.
Hazard_Rate Conditional probability that the PE firm could exit the portfolio company successfully. 
Exit_Types Exit types include three categories: IPO, M&A (Secondary buyout and trade sales), and unsuccessful exits (other exits and non-exit ones). (Source: Mergermarket) 
Institutions    
Low_Risk_Country 
Dummy variable which equals one if the country risk index of the portfolio company’s country 
is higher than 80. The country risk index consists of political risk components with 50% weight, 
economic risk components with 25% weight and financial risk components with 25% weight. 
(Source: International Country Risk Guide) 
Institutional_Distance 
Logarithm of one plus the absolute value of the country risk index differences between the 
country of portfolio company and the country of the PE firm. (Source: International Country 
Risk Guide) 
Cultural_Distance 
The cultural distance between the country of the leading PE firm and country of the portfolio 
company. It is measured as the distance between Hofstede's four-dimensional cultural factors 
on time-varying meta-analytic scores: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, 
and masculinity. (Source: Taras et al., 2011) 
Learning   
Country_Experience  
Logarithm of one plus the number of buyouts which the PE firm completed in the country of 
the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. (Source: Mergermarket 
and SDC Platinum M&A)
Multinational_Experience Logarithm of one plus the number of foreign countries in which the PE firm invested from1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. (Source: Mergermarket and SDC Platinum M&A) 
Industrial_Experience 
Logarithm of one plus as the number of buyouts which the PE firm completed in the industry 
of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. (Source: 
Mergermarket and SDC Platinum M&A)
Reputation Logarithm of one plus the number of buyouts completed by the PE firm three years prior to the initial buyout. (Source: Mergermarket and SDC Platinum M&A) 
Deal Characteristics   
Management Dummy variable which equals one if the management participates in the initial buyout transaction and zero otherwise. (Source: Mergermarket, SDC Platinum M&A, and Zephyr) 
Club_Size  The number of PE firms in the club deal. (Source: Mergermarket, SDC Platinum M&A, and Zephyr) 
Deal_Value Logarithm of buyout deal value. (Source: Mergermarket, SDC Platinum M&A, and Zephyr) 
PE Characteristics  
US_PE  Dummy variable which equals one if the PE firm headquarters in the US and zero otherwise. (Source: Mergermarket) 
UK_PE Dummy variable which equals one if the PE firm headquarters in the UK and zero otherwise. (Source: Mergermarket)
Country and Country-
pair Controls   
LBO_Market_ 
Development  
The number of buyouts in the country of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to 
the initial buyout. The number is then normalized by the country’s GDP in year t-1. (Source: 
SDC Platinum M&A and World Bank)
Common_Religion Dummy variable which equals one if the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio company have the same primary religion and zero otherwise. (Source: CIA World Factbook)
Common_Language 
Dummy variable which equals one if the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio 
company have the same first official language and zero otherwise. (Source: CIA World 
Factbook) 
Geographic_Distance Logarithm of geographic distance between the most populated city of the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio company. (Source: CEPII) 
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Appendix 2: Description of Variables  
Factors related to deal characteristics 
With the management team participating in the buyout transaction, the information asymmetry between 
PE firms and the portfolio company could be reduced and hence a better performance is anticipated. To account 
for the corporate governance characteristics, we adopt the dummy variable Management which equals one if the 
deal is defined as “management buyout” in Mergermarket, “acquirer including management” in SDC Platinum 
M&A database, or “management buyout” in Zephyr.  
Further, to account for the syndication among PE firms, the variable Club_Size is included. Officer, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) demonstrate that the PE club pays less for the buyout transaction and such lower pricing 
might be an inadvertent by-product of an unobserved motivation for club deals. Meuleman and Wright (2011) 
find that institutional differences induce the UK PE firms to cooperate with a local PE firm when they invest in 
continental Europe. The variable Club Size is calculated as the number of PE firms in the deal.7 Mergermarket, 
SDC and Zephyr provide limited information on portfolio companies other than transaction details. We include 
the deal value to control for the size effect and measure the quality of the portfolio company. The larger the deal 
value, the larger the investment the PE firm makes. The deal value could capture the quality of the portfolio 
company to a certain degree. The deal value information is from the “buy value” in Mergermarket, “transaction 
value” in SDC Platinum M&A or “deal value” in Zephyr.  
Factors related to country and country-pair characteristics 
Meuleman and Wright (2011) state that the development of local LBO market is one of the key factors 
in the institutional context. A mature LBO market could facilitate the exit process because there are more buyout-
related investment banks, law firms, and financial advisors and the transaction complexity could, therefore, be 
reduced. Also, PE firms could find more financial buyers and sell their portfolios via a secondary buyout. We 
construct the LBO_Market_Development variable as the aggregate number of LBOs in the country of the portfolio 
company from 1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout and normalize it by the country’s GDP in year t-1. We 
also consider other types variables measuring the link between the country of the PE firm and the country of the 
portfolio company. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) show that religion and language have an impact on the 
economic development. The religion and language information are extracted from Central Intelligent Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook. Variable Common_Religion is a dummy variable that equals one if the country of the PE 
firm and the country of the portfolio company have the same primary religion. Variable Common_Language is 
the dummy variable that equals one if they have the same first official language. Geographic proximity could 
favour the participation of PE firms in portfolio companies and improve the performance (Chen et al., 2010). We 
measure the geographic proximity by using the geographic distance between the most populated city of the country 
of the portfolio company and that of the PE firm country. The data is from CEPII database. Also, we track the law 
origin and commercial code of both portfolio companies’ nations and PE firms’ nations in Foreign Law Guide 
database. Following previous law and finance studies such as La Porta et al. (1998) and Lerner and Schoar (2005), 
the world legal systems are divided into six groups: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, 
Scandinavian civil law, Islamic law and Socialism background law. The legal origin information is incorporated 
in the multiple imputation estimation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 To find the club size in Mergermarket, we read through the details in buyer description, seller description, equity provider 
and deal description, and figure out the number of PE firms.  
34 
 
Table 1: Distribution of buyouts and exit types 
Panel A: Temporal distribution 
Panel A illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by the buyout year. The buyout sample includes 2,639 
worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket.  
Year Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
1998 2 75 77 8 11 19   96
1999 10 106 116 7 15 22   138
2000 6 116 122 11 13 24   146
2001 5 86 91 6 20 26   117
2002 7 115 122 12 17 29   151
2003 11 137 148 12 24 36   184
2004 14 205 219 19 64 83   302
2005 17 253 270 24 119 143   413
2006 23 269 292 38 221 259   551
2007 15 234 249 39 253 292   541
Total 110 1,596 1,706 176 757 933   2,639
 
Panel B: Industrial distribution 
Panel B illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by industry. The sample includes 2,639 worldwide 
buyouts over 11 SIC industries. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket.  
Industry Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
Agriculture 0 4 4 1 2 3   7
Mining 5 14 19 3 11 14   33
Construction 2 29 31 5 19 24   55
Manufacturing 45 776 821 85 277 362   1,183
Transportation 1 55 56 6 31 37   93
Communication 9 88 97 10 46 56   153
Energy 1 36 37 2 24 26   63
Whole Sales 4 42 46 4 18 22   68
Retails 10 112 122 13 60 73   195
Finance 6 66 72 10 71 81   153
Services 27 374 401 37 198 235   636
Total 110 1,596 1,706 176 757 933   2,639
 
Panel C: Countries of portfolio companies  
Panel C illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by countries of portfolio companies. The sample 
includes 2,639 worldwide buyouts across 38 countries and regions. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. 
Panel C includes the top ten countries in terms of the number of buyouts and presents them in descending order.  
Target Country Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
Germany 10 251 261 19 48 67  328
UK 12 160 172 16 88 104  276
France 4 183 187 17 56 73  260
US 7 103 110 17 54 71  181
India 4 47 51 15 73 88  139
Netherlands 7 81 88 11 36 47  135
Italy 3 88 91 7 32 39  130
Sweden 9 73 82 4 30 34  116
China 16 21 37 9 56 65  102
Canada 5 44 49 7 40 47  96
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Panel D: Countries of PE firms 
Panel D illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by countries of PE firms. The PE firms are from 41 
countries and regions. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. Panel D includes top ten countries in terms of 
the number of buyouts and presents them in descending order.  
PE Country Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
US 48 510 558 56 318 374  932
UK 40 590 630 51 148 199  829
France 5 68 73 12 21 33  106
Australia 1 43 44 9 43 52  96
Netherlands 1 59 60 4 16 20  80
Sweden 3 49 52 4 18 22  74
Hong Kong 2 29 31 5 29 34  65
Bahrain 1 44 45 7 9 16  61
Germany 0 30 30 6 9 15  45
Singapore 1 10 11 4 27 31  42
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
The table shows the summary statistics for key explanatory variables. The sample includes 2,639 worldwide 
buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket.  
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max 
Institutions      
Low_Risk_Country 2,639 0.634 0.482 0.000 1.000 
Institutional_Distance 2,639 1.553 0.676 0.000 3.370 
Cultural_Distance 2,639 0.291 0.136 0.000 0.980 
Learning      
Country_Experience 2,639 0.792 0.872 0.000 3.780 
Multinationa_Experience 2,639 1.313 0.931 0.000 3.220 
Industrial_Experience 2,639 1.637 1.255 0.000 5.160 
Reputation 2,639 2.220 1.117 0.000 4.440 
Controls      
Management 2,639 0.373 0.484 0.000 1.000 
Club_Size 2,639 1.409 0.891 1.000 11.000 
Deal_Value 1,975 4.892 1.563 2.303 7.623 
LBO_Market_Development 2,639 0.033 0.037 0.000 0.144 
Common_Religion 2,639 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000 
Common_Language 2,639 0.216 0.411 0.000 1.000 
Geographic_Distance 2,639 7.659 1.320 5.150 9.860 
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Table 3: Success ratio analysis 
The table presents the aggregate level analysis at target-PE country-pair level. The sample is extracted from 
Mergermarket. The dependent variable in models 1-2 is successful exit ratio over the entire period for country 
pair i. The dependent variable is models 3-4 is the successful exit ratio at the country pair i and in investment year 
t. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level and are in parentheses *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Institutions 
Low_Risk_Country 0.105** 0.113** 0.090*** 0.102***
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.031) (0.033)
Institutional_Distance -0.070* -0.068* -0.053*** -0.053***
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.019) (0.019)
Cultural_Distance -0.038 0.002 0.048 0.018
 (0.154) (0.160) (0.101) (0.102)
Controls   
Geographic_Distance  -0.041** -0.022**
  (0.017) (0.011)
LBO_Market_Development  -0.855 -0.765
  (0.740) (0.475)
Common_Religion  -0.012 -0.008
  (0.064) (0.035)
Common_Language  -0.036 -0.061
  (0.069) (0.042)
Observations 279 279 900 900
Year FE No No Yes Yes
R2 0.041 0.065 0.136 0.147
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Table 4: Cox proportional hazard estimation 
The sample includes 2,639 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The hazard 
rate is the conditional probability that the PE firm exits the portfolio company successfully. The holding time of the successful 
portfolio company is the total months from the buyout date to the successful exit date. For portfolio companies with unsuccessful 
exits, the holding time is the number of months between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date. 
In Cox hazard model, the failure event is the case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via IPO or M&A before the end of 
2015. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions  
Low_Risk_Country 0.237*** 0.190** 0.178** 0.178** 0.210** 0.164**
 (0.092) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.084) (0.071)
Institutional_Distance -0.074** -0.098*** -0.088** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.103***
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.037)
Cultural_Distance -0.012 -0.208 -0.098 -0.114 -0.221 -0.170
 (0.231) (0.224) (0.231) (0.231) (0.235) (0.250)
Learning   
Country_Experience 0.167***  
 (0.038)  
Multinational_Experience  0.241***  
  (0.027)  
Industrial_Experience  0.167***  
  (0.029)  
Reputation   0.191*** 0.185*** 0.181***
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.025)
Controls   
Management 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.196*** 0.251***
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.067)
Club_Size -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.086** -0.084** -0.108***
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Geographic_Distance -0.045** -0.079*** -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.067***
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
LBO_Market_Development  -0.418 -0.263
  (0.771) (0.645)
Common_Religion  0.004 0.043
  (0.045) (0.051)
Common_Language  -0.113* -0.144*
  (0.068) (0.078)
Deal_Value   0.079***
   (0.020)
Observations 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 1,975
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-Pseudolikelihood -12,341 -12,321 -12,327 -12,322 -12,320 -8,666
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Table 5: The role of PE firm’s experience 
The sample includes 2,639 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The hazard rate is the 
conditional probability that the PE firm exits the portfolio company successfully. The holding time of the successful portfolio company is 
the total months from the buyout date to the successful exit date. For portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits, the holding time is the 
number of months between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date. In Cox hazard model, the failure 
event is the case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via IPO or M&A before the end of 2015. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions   
Low_Risk_Country 0.239*** 0.188** 0.173** 0.175** 0.212*** 0.167** 
 (0.091) (0.080) (0.079) (0.082) (0.081) (0.066) 
Institutional_Distance -0.092* -0.173*** -0.174*** -0.154* -0.171*** -0.193*** 
 (0.051) (0.061) (0.055) (0.081) (0.052) (0.053) 
Cultural_Distance -0.007 -0.210 -0.077 -0.108 -0.193 -0.168 
 (0.230) (0.226) (0.236) (0.234) (0.236) (0.252) 
Learning   
Country_Experience 0.129*   
 (0.069)   
Institutional_Distance*Country_Experience 0.025   
 (0.038)   
Multinational_Experience  0.151**     
  (0.070)     
Institutional_Distance*Multinational_Experience  0.059     
  (0.046)     
Industrial_Experience   0.088**  0.081** 0.079* 
   (0.038)  (0.039) (0.044) 
Institutional_Distance*Industrial_Experience   0.054**  0.055** 0.058* 
   (0.023)  (0.024) (0.031) 
Reputation     0.146***   
    (0.055)   
Institutional_Distance*Reputation    0.030   
    (0.035)   
Controls   
Management 0.194*** 0.200*** 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.192*** 0.254*** 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.069) 
Club_Size -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.090*** -0.085** -0.087** -0.112*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
Geographic_Distance -0.046** -0.083*** -0.064*** -0.068*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) 
LBO_Market_Development  -0.528 -0.357
  (0.784) (0.639)
Common_Religion  0.019 0.052
  (0.046) (0.053)
Common_Language  -0.128* -0.159**
  (0.068) (0.080)
Deal_Value   0.079***
   (0.020)
Observations 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 1,975
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-Pseudolikelihood -12,341 -12,320 -12,326 -12,321 -12,323 -8,666
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Table 6: Multinomial logit analysis for choice of exit routes 
The sample includes 2,639 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. In models 1-4, the multinomial logit estimation is used. The base group in the multinomial 
logit model is group of portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits (other exits and non-exit ones). The dependent variable in model 5 is the dummy variable which equals one if the portfolio firm has gone public 
and zero if it is acquired. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model 
IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful 
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful
 IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful
 IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful
 IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful
 IPO vs. 
M&A 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Institutions     
Low_Risk_Country 0.251 0.338** 0.159 0.242* 0.141 0.222* 0.130 0.221**  -0.382 
 (0.337) (0.147) (0.306) (0.134) (0.307) (0.135) (0.229) (0.097)  (0.320) 
Institutional_Distance 0.055 -0.148** 0.008 -0.201*** 0.032 -0.181*** 0.045 -0.174**  0.191 
 (0.171) (0.061) (0.166) (0.055) (0.165) (0.058) (0.164) (0.069)  (0.180) 
Cultural_Distance 1.085 0.132 0.615 -0.187 0.926 0.035 0.900 -0.003  1.723 
 (0.828) (0.430) (0.839) (0.441) (0.809) (0.449) (0.729) (0.338)  (1.115) 
Learning     
Country_Experience 0.276* 0.293***    
 (0.151) (0.066)    
Multinational_Experience  0.578*** 0.361***    
  (0.133) (0.062)    
Industrial_Experience  0.366*** 0.284***   
  (0.093) (0.051)   
Reputation    0.381*** 0.300***  0.033 
  (0.098) (0.043)  (0.121) 
Deal Characteristics     
Management -0.037 0.402*** -0.086 0.399*** -0.088 0.372*** -0.091 0.379***  -0.932*** 
 (0.166) (0.084) (0.176) (0.086) (0.182) (0.085) (0.240) (0.100)  (0.227) 
Club_Size 0.221*** -0.213*** 0.212*** -0.217*** 0.219*** -0.209*** 0.228*** -0.203***  0.426*** 
 (0.069) (0.055) (0.074) (0.058) (0.074) (0.058) (0.077) (0.053)  (0.093) 
Geographic_Distance 0.071 -0.088*** -0.023 -0.161*** 0.037 -0.125*** 0.014 -0.140***  0.069 
 (0.114) (0.031) (0.101) (0.035) (0.105) (0.032) (0.089) (0.037)  (0.153) 
LBO_Market_Development    -0.763 
    (3.081) 
Common_Religion    -0.022 
    (0.315) 
Common_Language    0.549 
    (0.349) 
Deal_Value    0.304** 
    (0.130) 
Observations 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639  1,253 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.107 0.105 0.106  0.122 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -1,910 -1,895 -1,900 -1,898  -301.9 
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Table 7: Hazard analysis for IPO and M&A 
The sample includes 2,639 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The holding time of the successful portfolio company is the total months from the buyout date 
to the successful exit date. For portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits, the holding time is the number of months between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date. In models 
1-5, the failure event is the case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via IPO before the end of 2015. In models 6-10, the failure event is case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via M&A 
before the end of 2015. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 IPO  M&A  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Institutions   
Low_Risk_Country 0.129 0.101 0.092 0.081 -0.049 0.245** 0.195** 0.184** 0.184** 0.178** 
(0.347) (0.324) (0.322) (0.323) (0.310) (0.101) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092) (0.080) 
Institutional_Distance 0.114 0.100 0.116 0.124 0.109 -0.087** -0.112*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.120*** 
(0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.140) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Cultural_Distance 1.008 0.713 0.884 0.892 1.366 -0.094 -0.277 -0.177 -0.193 -0.330 
(0.784) (0.798) (0.751) (0.768) (0.950) (0.237) (0.239) (0.248) (0.245) (0.269) 
Learning    
Country_Experience 0.115  0.171***  
(0.141)  (0.037)  
Multinational_Experience  0.419***  0.228***  
 (0.108)  (0.027)  
Industrial_Experience  0.221***  0.163***  
 (0.069)  (0.030)  
Reputation  0.244*** 0.214** 0.186*** 0.177*** 
 (0.074) (0.098) (0.023) (0.027) 
Controls    
Management -0.222 -0.256 -0.244 -0.257 -0.593*** 0.219*** 0.230*** 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.308*** 
(0.171) (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) (0.188) (0.062) (0.069) (0.067) (0.066) (0.070) 
Club_Size 0.254*** 0.243*** 0.250*** 0.255*** 0.185*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.144*** -0.141*** -0.163*** 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.059) (0.048) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) 
Geographic_Distance 0.111 0.066 0.106 0.093 0.039 -0.055*** -0.089*** -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.076*** 
(0.119) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.132) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) 
LBO_Market_Development  -2.098 -0.156 
  (2.585) (0.705) 
Common_Language  -0.059 0.049 
 (0.321) (0.051) 
Common_Law_Origin  0.470 -0.195** 
 (0.319) (0.090) 
Deal_Value  0.320*** 0.060** 
 (0.104) (0.025) 
Observations 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 1,975 2,639 2,639 2,639 2,639 1,975 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -792.9 -786.3 -790.1 -789.5 -654.9 -11,516 -11,501 -11,505 -11,500 -7,969 
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Table 8: Robustness test for selection bias 
The sample includes 2,639 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. In the selection 
stage, the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the PE firm belongs to first quartile of experienced PE firm 
group based on the industrial experience. The model settings for the second stage analysis are similar to these settings in Tables 4, 
5, and 6, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Model 
Selection Cox 
Hazard
 Selection Cox 
Hazard 
 Selection IPO vs. 
M&A
(1) (2)  (3)
Institutions    
Low_Risk_Country  0.171** 0.165**   -0.354
  (0.067) (0.065)   (0.323)
Institutional_Distance  -0.101** -0.196***   0.187
  (0.039) (0.053)   (0.190)
Cultural_Distance  -0.081 -0.078   1.860*
  (0.255) (0.255)   (1.085)
Learning    
Industrial_Experience  0.139*** 0.050   0.008
 (0.029) (0.039)   (0.117)
Institutional_Distance*Industrial_  0.059**   
Experience  (0.029)   
Controls    
Management 0.157* 0.214*** 0.157* 0.212***  0.224*** -1.012***
 (0.086) (0.073) (0.086) (0.072)  (0.081) (0.222)
Club_Size -0.076 -0.092*** -0.076 -0.093***  -0.053 0.443***
 (0.053) (0.035) (0.053) (0.036)  (0.054) (0.097)
Geographic_Distance  -0.048*** -0.052***   0.086
  (0.014) (0.015)   (0.161)
LBO_Market_Development  -0.114 -0.130   -0.652
  (0.724) (0.723)   (3.080)
Common_Religion  0.063 0.056   -0.012
  (0.043) (0.041)   (0.329)
Common_Language  -0.154* -0.158*   0.550
  (0.082) (0.084)   (0.360)
Deal_Value 0.086*** 0.056** 0.086*** 0.056**  0.035 0.284**
 (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022)  (0.048) (0.134)
Private Equity Firms Origins    
US_PE 0.524*** 0.524***  0.588***
 (0.158) (0.158)  (0.191)
UK_PE 0.906*** 0.906***  0.969***
 (0.136) (0.136)  (0.174)
Inverse_Mills_Ratio  -0.295** -0.298**   -0.481
  (0.124) (0.121)   (0.371)
Observations 1,975 1,975 1,975 1,975  1,253 1,253
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.075 - 0.075 -  0.0742 0.124
Log-Pseudolikelihood -1,026 -1,026 -1,026 -8,721  -687.1 -301.3
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Table 9: Robustness test for imputed deal value 
The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. In Table 9, following Strömberg (2008), we impute the deal value with Multiple 
Imputation. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Cox Hazard Cox Hazard  IPO vs. M&A(1) (2)  (3)
Institutions  
Low_Risk_Country 0.143* 0.138*  -0.397
 (0.076) (0.076)  (0.269)
Institutional_Distance -0.085** -0.172***  0.195
 (0.035) (0.055)  (0.191)
Cultural_Distance -0.096 -0.075  1.392
 (0.225) (0.230)  (0.975)
Learning  
Industrial_Experience 0.154** 0.075**  0.082
 (0.029) (0.038)  (0.089)
Institutional_Distance*Industrial_Experience   0.054**   
   (0.024)   
Controls  
Management 0.187* 0.180***  -0.562***
 (0.063) (0.062)  (0.201)
Club_Size -0.101** -0.102***  0.444***
 (0.034 (0.034  (0.098)
Geographic_Distance -0.064** -0.067***  0.110
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.137)
LBO_Market_Development   -1.769 
     (2.709) 
Common_Religion   -0.132 
   (0.247) 
Common_Language   0.589** 
   (0.299) 
Deal_Value 0.059** 0.059***  0.243**
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.116)
Observations 2,639 2,639  2,639
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes
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Figure 1-4: Plots of Kaplan-Meier failure functions 
 
Figure 1: Groups based on Country Risk 
 
Figure 2: Groups based on Institutional Distance 
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Figure 3: Groups based on Cultural Distance 
 
Figure 4: Groups based on Reputation 
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